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Abstract
In his discussion of minimax decision rules, Savage (1954, p. 170) presents an ex-
ample purporting to show that minimax applied to negative expected utility (referred
to by Savage as “negative income”) is an inadequate decision criterion for statistics;
he suggests the application of a minimax regret rule instead. The crux of Savage’s
objection is the possibility that a decision maker would choose to ignore even “exten-
sive” information. More recently, Parmigiani (1992) has suggested that minimax regret
suffers from the same flaw. He demonstrates the existence of “relevant” experiments
that a minimax regret agent would never pay a positive cost to observe. On closer
inspection, I find that minimax regret is more resilient to this critique than would
first appear. In particular, there are cases in which no experiment has any value to
an agent employing the minimax negative income rule, while we may always devise
a hypothetical experiment that a minimax regret agent would pay for. The force of
Parmigiani’s critique is further blunted by the observation that “relevant” experiments
exist for which a Bayesian agent would never pay. I conclude with a discussion of
pessimism in the context of minimax decision rules.
1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the application of minimax proce-
dures to statistical and econometric problems. Manski (2004) for instance, has spawned a
literature on the application of minimax regret to treatment choice, and Stoye (2011) has
carefully examined the axiomatic distinctions between different minimax rules. One rea-
son for this newfound popularity is surely the increase in computing power now available
to researchers, rendering such methods feasible in more domains. With renewed interest
has come increased scrutiny. In particular, concerns over the use of information by mini-
max procedures have resurfaced. It has long been known that minimax applied to negative
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expected utility (hereafter, “negative income”) can entirely ignore available information in
some decision problems. Savage (1954, p. 170) presented a simple example demonstrating
this phenomenon, asserting that minimax applied to negative income was entirely inadequate
as a criterion for statistics. His alternative was applying minimax to regret. While many
credit Savage with the invention of the minimax regret criterion, Savage himself gave prior-
ity to Wald (1950), believing that Wald could not possibly have intended minimax negative
income in his work. Savage clearly believed this critique inapplicable to regret, but more
recent work has disputed this.
Parmigiani (1992) analyzes an example in which minimax applied to negative income
assigns positive value to an experiment, while minimax regret does not. He goes on to
characterize the circumstances under which minimax rules refrain from “relevant” experi-
mentation, even if the experiment is nearly costless. Parmigiani describes this phenomenon
as ultrapessimism. The essence of his result is best understood if we interpret the statis-
tician’s problem as a zero sum game played against nature. If nature has an equilirium
strategy that is supported on relatively few states, then experiments that fail to distinguish
these states will be worthless. If such cases can be expected to occur regularly outside of
contrived examples, then this raises serious concerns about the use of minimax regret in
applied work.
One goal of the present paper is to controvert this criticism of minimax applied to regret.
Savage’s example uncovered a more fundamental flaw in minimax negative income than the
one Parmigiani discusses. In some decision problems, minimax negative income not only fails
to utilize an observation that another procedure finds valuable, but in fact no conceivable
experiment provides any value to an agent following a minimax negative income rule. This is
in stark contrast to the situation we find with minimax regret, where we can always construct
a valuable experiment. Moreover, even when valuable experiments do exist for the minimax
negative income rule, there may still be some states for which no amount of evidence in their
favor will cause the decision maker to adopt an action better suited to those states. Again,
minimax applied to regret avoids such issues. On further examination, the characterization
of ultrapessimism Parmigiani gives can apply to Bayesian procedures just as easily—even
when a minimax regret agent would pay for the information. Ultrapessimism, so defined, fails
to distinguish meaningfully between decision procedures, but Savage’s observation remains
a substantive distinction between minimax regret and minimax negative income.
A second goal is to critically examine other objections to minimax regret. There are
other senses in which we can describe the procedure as “pessimistic,” and these may present
challenges to researchers in applications. Many issues stem from prescriptions that go against
what we intuitively expect from a “good” estimator. In a sense, regret is criticized for failing
to conform to our prior information, but a major motivation for minimax procedures is to
avoid subjective priors. An important direction for future work lies in devising ways to
utilize such information alongside minimax procedures.
In the next section I provide a detailed analysis of the examples given by Savage (1954)
and Parmigiani (1992). The following section generalizes previous results that characterize
when minimax values information. This section also establishes the key distinction between
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minimax applied to negative income and minimax applied to regret. Finally, I offer some
thoughts on the problem of “pessimism” in minimax estimation and the effective application
of minimax regret.
2 Examples
In this section I present two examples; first, Savage’s (1954) example, followed by Parmi-
giani’s (1992). Consider a state space partitioned into two events, B1 and B2, with two
primary acts, f1 and f2. Suppose f1 yields a payoff of −1 utiles in both events, and f2 yields
−10 if B1 obtains and 1 if B2 obtains.
B1 B2
f1 −1 −1
f2 −10 1
Assuming the decision maker is capable of making randomized choices, there are derived
acts of the form f = λf1 + (1 − λ)f2 for λ ∈ [0, 1]. The negative income from a particular
act in each event is then,
−I(f ;B1) = 10− 9λ, −I(f ;B2) = 2λ− 1.
Note for all values of λ in the given range, −I(f ;B1) is larger than −I(f ;B2), so if our
decision maker applies a minimax negative income decision rule, the chosen act will be the
one that minimizes −I(f ;B1), which is to simply choose f1 with probability 1.
Now suppose the decision maker has the option to observe at no cost the random variable
X taking values in {1, 2} with
P(X = 1 |B1) = P(X = 2 |B2) = 1− g,
P(X = 2 |B1) = P(X = 1 |B2) = g,
for some g < 1
2
. There are now four primary acts as functions of X: g1(X) = f1 for each
value of X, g2(X) = f2 for each value of X, g3 defined by g3(1) = f1 and g3(2) = f2, and
g4 defined by g4(1) = f2 and g4(2) = f1. The set of derived acts available to the decision
maker are the convex combinations of these four: f = λ1g1 + λ2g2 + λ3g3 + λ4g4, where
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = 1. For such an act, we can calculate the negative income in each event
as,
−I(f ;B1) = λ1 + 10λ2 + (1 + 9g)λ3 + (10− 9g)λ4,
−I(f ;B2) = λ1 − λ2 + (2g − 1)λ3 + (1− 2g)λ4.
Just as before, we have −I(f ;B1) ≥ −I(f ;B2) for all feasible parameter values. In the
expression for −I(f ;B1), the coefficients of the λ2, λ3, and λ4 terms are all strictly larger
than 1, so this is minimized by allocating all weight to λ1. That is, the decision maker
3
chooses f1 regardless of the observed X and regardless of the value g, earning utility of −1
in all cases. If observing X were costly, the agent would evidently decline the observation, no
matter how small the cost. This is the basis for Savage’s criticism of the minimax negative
income rule.
Compare this result with that obtained using a minimax regret rule when faced with the
same situation. Let L(f ;Bi) denote the regret of action f if Bi obtains. For the original
problem in the absence of the observation, we have
L(f ;B1) = 9(1− λ), L(f ;B2) = 2λ.
The decision maker chooses λ to minimize the maximum of L(f ;B1) and L(f ;B2). Note
L(f ;B1) is strictly decreasing in λ, and L(f ;B2) is strictly increasing. Therefore, the minimal
maximum occurs when L(f ;B1) = L(f ;B2), or 9(1−λ) = 2λ, implying λ = 911 . Substituting
λ = 9
11
into the equation for L(f ;B2) yields the minimal regret
L(f ;B2) = 2λ = 2 · 9
11
=
18
11
.
Given the same random variable X as before, and the same four primary acts, the
situation changes. The regret we compute in each event is
L(f ;B1) = 9λ2 + 9gλ3 + 9(1− g)λ4, L(f ;B2) = 2λ1 + 2gλ3 + 2(1− g)λ4.
Note since g < 1
2
, the coefficient of λ3 is lower than that of λ4 in both of these. Therefore,
the minimal regret must occur with λ4 = 0.
Now consider the following observations. If λ1 < (9λ2 + 7gλ3)/2, then L(f ;B1) >
L(f ;B2), and we can reduce the maximum of L(f ;B1) and L(f ;B2) by reallocating a small
amount of weight from either λ2 or λ3 to λ1. Therefore, we must have λ1 ≥ (9λ2 + 7gλ3)/2
and L(f ;B1) ≤ L(f ;B2). In fact, we must have equality. If L(f ;B1) < L(f ;B2), then the
maximum is reduced by reallocating some weight from λ1 to λ2.
Write λ3 = 1− λ1 − λ2, and the condition λ1 = (9λ2 + 7gλ3)/2 becomes
(9− 9g)λ2 − 9gλ1 + 9g = (2− 2g)λ1 − 2gλ2 + 2g =⇒ λ1 = (9− 7g)λ2 + 7g
2 + 7g
.
The regret is then
(9− 9g)λ2 − 9g (9− 7g)λ2 + 7g
2 + 7g
+ 9g =
18− 36g
2 + 7g
λ2 + 9g +
63g2
2 + 7g
.
Since g < 1
2
, the coefficient of λ2 is positive, and the regret is minimized at λ2 = 0. Thus,
the minimax regret act sets λ1 = 7g/(7g+ 2), λ2 = 0, and λ3 = 2/(7g+ 2). We compute the
minimal regret as
L(f ;B1) = 9gλ3 = 9g · 2
7g + 2
=
18g
7g + 2
,
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which goes to zero as g goes to zero (i.e. as X becomes more informative). The agent should
be willing to pay as much as 18
11
− 18g/(7g + 2) > 0 to observe X.
For the second example, consider a box containing two ordered marbles in one of three
arrangements. Either both are red, the first is blue with the second red, or both are blue.
Two primary acts are available. The act f1 pays −2 utiles if both are red, 0 if the first is
blue and the second red, and −4 if both are blue. The act f2 pays −4 if both are red or the
first blue and the second red, and it pays 0 if both are blue. The payoff table is depicted
below.
RR BR BB
f1 −2 0 −4
f2 −4 −4 0
Considering mixed actions as before, the negative income from choosing f = λf1 + (1−λ)f2
in each state is
−I(f ;RR) = 4− 2λ, −I(f ;BR) = 4− 4λ, −I(f ;BB) = 4λ.
We have −I(f ;BR) ≤ −I(f ;RR) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], so we can solve for the minimax solution
by taking−I(f ;RR) = −I(f ;BB), implying λ = 2
3
. Substituting this value into the equation
for −I(f ;BB) gives the expected negative income of 8
3
.
If the decision maker can observe the first marble at no cost, there are four primary acts
as a function of the observation. In fact, we need only consider two of these acts since f1
dominates f2 whenever the observed marble is red. If the first marble is blue, then clearly the
minimax solution is to choose f1 and f2 with equal probability, leading to expected negative
income of 2 in each state. The decision maker should be willing to pay as much as 2
3
to
observe the first marble.
Now consider a decision maker using minimax regret in the same situation. The regret
table is
RR BR BB
f1 0 0 4
f2 2 4 0
The regret from the act f = λf1 + (1− λ)f2 in each state is
L(f ;RR) = 2− 2λ, L(f ;BR) = 4− 4λ, L(f ;BB) = 4λ.
Since L(f ;BR) ≥ L(f ;RR) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], we can solve for the minimax strategy by
taking L(f ;BR) = L(f ;BB), implying λ = 1
2
. The minimax regret strategy is to randomize
equally between the two acts, yielding a maximum expected regret of 2.
Given the opportunity to observe the first marble, a cursory examination of the payoff
table shows that zero regret can be achieved in state RR, but will remain unchanged in
the other two. The optimal strategy will be to randomize equally between the act that
chooses f1 always and the act that chooses f1 only when the observed marble is red. The
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maximum regret is still 2, so the decision maker should be unwilling to pay any positive
amount for the observation based on the minimax regret criterion. Parmigiani (1992) claims
that this example shows minimax regret is vulnerable to the same criticism as minimax
negative income. In the next section, I shall rebut this claim while providing some insight
into when these two decision rules will ignore available information.
3 The Value of an Experiment
We can understand the phenomenon demonstrated through these examples via the cor-
respondence between the decision maker’s problem and a two player zero sum game played
between nature and the decision maker (Wald, 1950). Consider a decision problem with a
finite collection of states Ω and a finite number of primary acts. Imagine the corresponding
payoff table, either a negative income or a regret table. If we consider this problem as a
zero sum game in which nature earns the negative of the decision maker’s payoff, then it is
well-known that the Nash equilibria of the game share a common value, and this is the value
the decision maker will achieve through application of a minimax decision rule.
Let σ = (σd, σn) denote an equilibrium strategy profile in the game described above, and
let Ωσ denote the collection of states that nature plays with positive probability under σ.
Consider a random variable X taking values in some arbitrary measure space (S,S); we shall
call such a random variable an experiment if the decision maker can observe its value prior
to acting. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. In the decision problem described above, the experiment X has no value to
a minimax decision maker if there exists an equilibrium strategy profile σ such that
P(X ∈ S |ω1) = P(X ∈ S |ω2)
for all ω1, ω2 ∈ Ωσ and for all S ∈ S.
If there are only two primary acts, and the experiment X has no value, then such an
equilibrium strategy profile necessarily exists.
Proof. Observe first that the value of the game to the decision maker can be no lower
with the experiment since the decision maker may always choose to ignore it. If we have
P(X ∈ S |ω1) = P(X ∈ S |ω2) for all ω1, ω2 ∈ Ωσ and all S ∈ S, then nature may play the
strategy specified by σ and be sure to obtain the same value from the game with or without
the experiment X. The value of the game is therefore unchanged; hence, the attainable
minimax value is unchanged with the introduction of the experiment.
Conversely, suppose there are two primary acts, and after introducing the experiment,
nature has a strategy σn that can ensure the same value of the game as without the experi-
ment. Consider a minimal such strategy, in the sense that nature cannot ensure this payoff
through randomization over a strict subset of the states played with positive probability in
σn. Nature could have played σn in the game without the experiment, obtaining a value at
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least as high; therefore, this strategy is part of an equilibrium strategy profile (σd, σn) in the
game without the experiment.
If there exist ω1, ω2 ∈ Ωσ and S ∈ S with
p1 = P(X ∈ S |ω1) 6= P(X ∈ S |ω2) = p2,
I claim that the decision maker can obtain a strictly higher payoff if nature plays σn after
the introduction of the experiment. To see why, consider two cases. First suppose that σn
is minmal in the game without the experiment. Given there are two primary acts f1 and f2,
we can relabel ω1 and ω2 such that the payoff from f1 is at least as high as that from f2 in
state ω1, and the payoff from f2 is at least as high as that from f1 in state ω2. One of these
inequalities is strict: otherwise σn is clearly not minimal (we could remove either ω1 or ω2
from the support of nature’s strategy). We can partition Ωσ into Ω1 and Ω2, with ω1 ∈ Ω1,
ω2 ∈ Ω2, and
P(X ∈ S |ω ∈ Ω1) 6= P(X ∈ S |ω ∈ Ω2).
Without loss of generality, suppose the first probability is greater. Consider the strategy
σ
(X)
d , which plays f1 if X ∈ S and f2 if X ∈ Sc, and note that for small enough λ the
strategy λσ
(X)
d + (1− λ)σd will obtain a strictly higher payoff than σd in response to σn.
Alternatively, if σn is no longer minimal when the experiment is removed from the game,
we can find a minimal equilibrium strategy σ′n for nature to follow in the game without
the experiment, which is supported on a strict subset of the states supporting σn. By the
argument in the preceding paragraph, we cannot have ω1, ω2 ∈ Ωσ′ and S ∈ S with
p1 = P(X ∈ S |ω1) 6= P(X ∈ S |ω2) = p2.
Otherwise the experiment allows the decision maker to make a strict improvement. However,
the argument in the first paragraph of this proof implies that σ′n is an equilibrium strategy
of nature in the game with the experiment, guaranteeing the same payoff. This contradicts
the minimality of σn in the game with the experiment. Therefore, σn is minimal in the game
without the experiment, and we have
P(X ∈ S |ω ∈ Ω1) 6= P(X ∈ S |ω ∈ Ω2)
for all ω1, ω2 ∈ Ωσ and S ∈ S.
I note in passing that the restriction to two primary acts in the second part of the
proposition is needed to rule out the situation depicted in the following regret table, in
which many (but not all!) informative experiments are insufficient to cause a minimax agent
to deviate from f3.
ω1 ω2
f1 0 10
f2 10 0
f3 1 1
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The key insight of this result is that an experiment is worthless to a minimax agent
if it does not discriminate between the states that nature plays in equilibrium. Put this
way, it sounds rather unremarkable, but it explains the unwillingness of minimax agents to
pay for information in the examples given previously. If nature makes use of only a small
subset of available states in equilibrium, then the minimax agent’s decision process is entirely
dominated by this subset of states, and experiments giving information about other states
will have no value. In Savage’s example, nature has a dominant strategy in the negative
income game, and consequently there can never be an experiment with value to a minimax
negative income agent. In Parmigiani’s example, state RR is weakly dominated in the regret
game, but not in the negative income game.
Parmigiani (1992) proves a similar result under somewhat stronger conditions, and calls
a decision rule ultrapessimistic about the experiment X if X is “relevant,” yet has no value.
An experiment is called relevant if there exist distinct states ω1 and ω2, and a set S ∈ S,
such that
P(X ∈ S |ω1) 6= P(X ∈ S |ω2).
As a corollary, Parmigiani shows that as long as there are at least three states, and nature
has an equilibrium strategy that is supported on a strict subset of the state space, then
there exist experiments for which the minimax rule is ultrapessimistic. The need for three
distinct states stems from a feature of games in regret form: so long as the decision maker
does not have a dominant strategy, nature must employ a mixed strategy in equilibrium.
Thus, nature’s equilibrium strategy is supported on at least two states, and ultrapessimism
cannot appear in the regret form of a decision problem with two states.
This hints at a more significant distinction between minimax negative income and min-
imax regret. In the negative income game, nature may have strictly dominated strategies,
and information in favor of these states will always be worthless. In a regret form game, no
state ever represents a strictly dominated strategy for nature. This ensures that valuable
experiments always exist, and further, a strong enough signal in favor of a given state will
decrease the regret obtained in that state.
Proposition 2. Consider a decision problem with finitely many states and finitely many
primary acts. If the minimax regret is greater than zero, there exists an experiment with
strictly positive value to a minimax regret agent.
Note that the experiment need not reveal the true state with certainty. Further, Savage’s
(1954) analysis of partition problems demonstrates that repeated observation will cause the
minimax regret to approach zero.
Proof. Let L denote the maximum regret from any act in any state, and let L∗ denote the
minimax regret of the decision problem in the absence of an experiment. Label the states of
nature ω1, ω2, ..., ωn, and choose the experiment X such that
P(X = i |ωi) = L− L
∗
L
, P(X = i |ωj, j 6= i) = L
∗
(n− 1)L.
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It is a simple exercise to verify that this experiment enables a strict improvement in minimax
regret, and the signal i must increase the probability that the optimal action in state i is
chosen.
I contend that the spirit of Savage’s objection to minimax negative income lies in the
existence of decision problems for which no such experiment can be devised, and in this
sense, the critique clearly does not apply to the minimax regret decision rule. Indeed this
claim is bolstered by the observation that a Bayesian decision maker is vulnerable to the
charge of ultrapessimism as defined above. Recall the payoff table from Savage’s example.
B1 B2
f1 −1 −1
f2 −10 1
Given the same experiment X described in section 2, a Bayesian with a prior that assigns
equal probability to B1 and B2 will place zero value on the experiment so long as g ≥ 211 .
Clearly, experiments with 2
11
≤ g < 1
2
are relevant according to the definition given by Parmi-
giani (1992), so this would have us label the Bayesian as ultrapessimistic. Further, recall
from our previous analysis that for this range of g, a minimax regret agent attaches a strictly
positive value to the experiment. The existence of “relevant” but worthless experiments for
a minimax regret agent fails to distinguish minimax regret from other decision rules. The
existence of decision problems in which no experiment is valuable stands out as a property
of minimax applied to negative income.
4 Discussion
The analysis from the previous section suggests that the relevance of an experiment to
a decision maker is best viewed in the context of the decision rule being applied: we could
simply say that an observation is relevant if it has value to the decision maker, given the
decision rule. The real question becomes what observations are relevant. For any pair of
decision rules we have considered, we can construct examples in which an observation is
relevant to one but not the other, or vice versa.
Minimax applied to negative income has the peculiar feature of ignoring any conceivable
experiment in some decision problems. Other examples of this are presented by Hodges and
Lehmann (1950) and by Radner and Marschak (1954). Hodges and Lehmann examine the
problem of estimating the parameter of a binomial distribution. Under one loss function they
consider, the minimax negative income estimate is constant despite any observations made.
Similarly, Radner and Marschak posit a hypothetical gamble on the outcome of flipping a
weighted coin. They show that a decision maker applying a minimax negative income rule
never observes more than one flip of the coin to obtain information, even if doing so is nearly
costless. More recently, Manski (2004) has noted this problem in the context of treatment
choice. In all of these examples, the minimax regret rule avoids the pitfall of failing to utilize
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information; Savage (1954, p. 200) even addresses the example of Hodges and Lehmann
(1950) directly.
The Hurwicz criterion has been proposed as a way to address the pessimism of minimax
applied to negative income. In its general form, the criterion suggests choosing an action f
to maximize
H(f) = φ(sup
Bi
I(f ;Bi), inf
Bi
I(f ;Bi)),
where φ is any monotonically increasing function of both arguments, and {Bi} is a partition
of the state space. Unfortunately, as shown by Radner and Marschak (1954), the Hurwicz
criterion falls victim to essentially the same problem as the minimax negative income rule. A
small set of states can entirely dominate the decision making process, and there are examples
in which no conceivable experiment is relevant. In the simplest case, suppose there are three
possible events, B1, B2, and B3. Suppose that if B1 obtains, then no matter what action is
chosen, the payoff will be higher than in all other events, and suppose that if B3 obtains,
then no matter what action is chosen, the payoff will be lower than in all other events. The
Hurwicz criterion then simplifies to choosing an action which maximizes
H(f) = φ(I(f ;B1), I(f ;B3)),
and the consequences of an action in event B2 are completely ignored, even if available
information strongly suggests that B2 obtains.
As mentioned in the introduction, treatment choice has recently become an important
domain for the application of minimax estimation procedures.1 Early work in this area by
Manski (2004, Sec. 2.3) observed the problem of ultrapessimism when employing a minimax
negative income rule. In the illustrative example he provides, the issue is precisely that nature
has a dominant strategy—namely, choosing an especially poor outcome distribution for the
innovative treatment—resulting in a no-data rule. This demonstrates that the problem with
the minimax negative income rule extends beyond hypothetical examples to contexts of
serious practical importance. Minimax regret is free from this flaw, allowing meaningful
application of minimax procedures to treatment choice.
In this same context, Stoye (2009, 2012) has renewed concerns about the pessimism of
minimax applied to regret while simultaneously offering solutions. In particular, without any
restriction on the space of strategies available to nature, information provided by covariates
is of no use to a minimax regret procedure: the procedure will treat the outcome distribution
for each value of the covariate independently, as though it were completely unrelated to the
distributions for other covariate values. Intuitively this is clear: in the zero-sum game, nature
refrains from providing extra information to the statistician by choosing the distributions
for each value of the covariate independently from one another. Stoye (2009) has noted that
with infinitely many covariate values, this leads to a no-data rule for the minimax regret
procedure. This result should be unsurprising. Given the state space under consideration,
nature is free to independently choose a different outcome distribution for infinitely many
values of the covariate. Under these circumstances, a Bayesian estimator is inconsistent
1Manski (2004, 2007); Stoye (2009, 2012)
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essentially everywhere2. Finite samples are unable to provide meaningful information in these
situations. Stoye (2012) takes the view that this problem results from an underspecification
of the prior information, and he suggests incoporating prior information into the model by
restricting the space of strategies available to nature.
Savage (1954, p. 203) acknowledged a distinct but related criticism of minimax decision
rules, derived from another example given by Hodges and Lehmann (1950). The example
again concerns estimating the parameter of a binomial distribution. If squared error is used
as the loss function, then the minimax regret estimate suffers higher loss than the maximum
likelihood estimate over most of the parameter space. As the number of trials grows without
bound, the region in which minimax regret is superior becomes vanishingly small. In this
example, minimax appears overly concerned with the possibility that the parameter lies
in a small neighborhood of 1
2
, and it sacrifices performance elsewhere to reduce the risk
of loss in this part of the parameter space. This phenomenon could also be described as
pessimism. Stoye (2009) notes what I believe is a related example in his concluding remarks,
in which a sample that is heavily skewed towards one treatment leads to a counter-intuitive
recommendation.
Such pessimism may be an inevitable consequence of ensuring “uniform” performance
across all possible states. In the case of the binomial distribution, it is a result of the relatively
high variance of a binomial random variable with parameter close to 1
2
. This feature of the
binomial distribution renders it more difficult to estimate the parameter in this region, and
obtaining uniform performance necessitates sacrificing performance in regions with lower
variance. One might consider rescaling the loss function to obtain a more desirable estimate.
Indeed, the choice of loss function for parameter estimation seems to have received little
attention, yet it is fundamental to the behavior of the minimax regret procedure. With
modern computational tools, it may be feasible to consider minimax regret estimates over a
range of loss functions, providing another potential avenue for future research.
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